Saturday, December 28, 2013

Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly

PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC
6 EDITION
KARL CASE, RAY FAIR
PRENTICE HALL BUSINESS PUBLISHING
COPY RIGHT 2002
 
Monopolistic Competition
         A monopolistically competitive industry has the following characteristics:
         A large number of firms
         No barriers to entry
         Product differentiation
Monopolistic Competition
         Monopolistic competition is a common form of industry (market) structure in the United States, characterized by a large number of firms, none of which can influence market price by virtue of size alone.
         Some degree of market power is achieved by firms producing differentiated products.
         New firms can enter and established firms can exit such an industry with ease.
The Case for Product Differentiation and Advertising
         The advocates of free and open competition believe that differentiated products and advertising give the market system its vitality and are the basis of its power.
         Product differentiation helps to ensure high quality and efficient production.
The Case for Product Differentiation and Advertising
         Advertising provides consumers with the valuable information on product availability, quality, and price that they need to make efficient choices in the market place.
The Case Against Product Differentiation and Advertising
         Critics of product differentiation and advertising argue that they amount to nothing more than waste and inefficiency.
         Enormous sums are spent to create minute, meaningless, and possibly nonexistent differences among products.
         Advertising raises the cost of products and frequently contains very little information.  Often, it is merely an annoyance.
         People exist to satisfy the needs of the economy, not vice versa.
         Advertising can lead to unproductive warfare and may serve as a barrier to entry, thus reducing real competition.
Oligopoly
         An oligopoly is a form of industry (market) structure characterized by a few dominant firms.  Products may be homogeneous or differentiated.
         The behavior of any one firm in an oligopoly depends to a great extent on the behavior of others.
Oligopoly Models
         All kinds of oligopoly have one thing in common:
         The behavior of any given oligopolistic firm depends on the behavior of the other firms in the industry comprising the oligopoly.
The Collusion Model
         A group of firms that gets together and makes price and output decisions jointly is called a cartel.
         Collusion occurs when price- and quantity-fixing agreements are explicit.
         Tacit collusion occurs when firms end up fixing price without a specific agreement, or when agreements are implicit.
The Cournot Model
         The Cournot model is a model of a two-firm industry (duopoly) in which a series of output-adjustment decisions leads to a final level of output between the output that would prevail if the market were organized competitively and the output that would be set by a monopoly.
The Kinked Demand Curve Model
         The kinked demand model is a model of oligopoly in which the demand curve facing each individual firm has a “kink” in it.  The kink follows from the assumption that competitive firms will follow if a single firm cuts price but will not follow if a single firm raises price.
The Price-Leadership Model
         Price-leadership is a form of oligopoly in which one dominant firm sets prices and all the smaller firms in the industry follow its pricing policy.
         Assumptions of the price-leadership model:
         The industry is made up of one large firm and a number of smaller, competitive firms;
         The dominant firm maximizes profit subject to the constraint of market demand and subject to the behavior of the smaller firms;
         The dominant firm allows the smaller firms to sell all they want at the price the leader has set.
         Outcome of the price-leadership model:
         The quantity demanded in the industry is split between the dominant firm and the group of smaller firms.
         This division of output is determined by the amount of market power that the dominant firm has.
         The dominant firm has an incentive to push smaller firms out of the industry in order to establish a monopoly.
Predatory Pricing
         The practice of a large, powerful firm driving smaller firms out of the market by temporarily selling at an artificially low price is called predatory pricing.
         Such behavior became illegal in the United States with the passage of antimonopoly legislation around the turn of the century.
Game Theory
         Game theory analyzes oligopolistic behavior as a complex series of strategic moves and reactive countermoves among rival firms.
         In game theory, firms are assumed to anticipate rival reactions.
Contestable Markets
         A market is perfectly contestable if entry to it and exit from it are costless.
         In contestable markets, even large oligopolistic firms end up behaving like perfectly competitive firms.  Prices are pushed to long-run average cost by competition, and positive profits do not persist.
Oligopoly is Consistent with a Variety of Behaviors
         The only necessary condition of oligopoly is that firms are large enough to have some control over price.
         Oligopolies are concentrated industries.  At one extreme is the cartel, in essence, acting as a monopolist.  At the other extreme, firms compete for small contestable markets in response to observed profits.  In between are a number of alternative models, all of which stress the interdependence of oligopolistic firms.
Oligopoly and Economic Performance
         Oligopolies, or concentrated industries, are likely to be inefficient for the following reasons:
         They are likely to price above marginal cost.  This means that there would be underproduction from society’s point of view.
         Strategic behavior can force firms into deadlocks that waste resources.
         Product differentiation and advertising may pose a real danger of waste and inefficiency.
The Role of Government
         The Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950 extended the government’s authority to ban vertical and conglomerate mergers.
         The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a mathematical calculation that uses market share figures to determine whether or not a proposed merger will be challenged by the government.

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